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Purpose: We revisit the relationship between institutional quality and economic 
growth. 
Design/methodology/approach: A panel cointegration methodology and causality 
analysis are applied to 27 post-socialist economies over the period 1996 to 2016.
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associated with the rule of law and voice and accountability. In the short run, regulatory 
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dimension of our variables, we provide supporting evidence of the strong links between 
the quality of institutions and economic growth hence rendering robust results. 
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Generally speaking the term “institution” includes the customs and traditions that have 
existed for a long time as well as the organisations and systems that are important, if 
not highly critical features of a particular society or a group. In Aristotle’s Politics, the 
City-State a natural institution that is prior in nature to a household and each individual, 
exists for the supreme benefit of its citizens, their well-being. Broadly, institutions set 
the rules in societies and influence critically the functioning of national economies as 
it affects all economic agents. In this context, institutions matter greatly in the realm of 
economic growth while institutional quality is a key factor in the pursuit of economic 
growth and prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
In the 1990s, Williamson (2004) proposed several economic-policy rules known as the 
Washington Consensus to enable higher rates of economic growth for the developing 
economies in Latin America. Financial liberalisation, the abolition of (un)necessary 
regulation,  and  the  provision  of  secure  property  rights  were  inter  alia  the  most 
“popular” reforms. The economic performance, measured in terms of GDP per capita 
of the countries that carried out these reforms turned out to be rather disappointing 
hence,  suggesting  that  the  implementation  of  the  envisaged  ”right  policies”  was 
problematic  (Ortiz,  2003).  A  similar  prescription  that  was  mainly  driven  by  these 
policies - stabilisation, privatization and liberalization - was also implemented by post-
soviet States in the form of shock reforms. As it transpired, however, these reforms 
proved to be disastrous causing economic growth to falter (Hamm et al., 2012). Many 
years later however, institutions were believed to matter more than what “reformers” 
have previously expected. 
In the past 30 years we have witnessed a dramatic transformation of Europe’s former 
communist  countries.  Effectively,  these  economies  implemented  certain  policies  to 
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move closer to free market economies. During this process however, institutional 
reforms in areas such as governance, competition policy, labor markets, privatization 
and enterprise restructuring were undermined by opposing political groups that pursued 
their own vested interests (IMF, 2014).
Prior to 1990-91, all ex-Soviet republics were sharing the same institutional features 
implied by the nature of the socialist framework of governance. Following the demise 
of Soviet Union, ex-republics have demonstated fluctuating performance in terms of 
economic and institutional development and functioning of their political regimes. For 
instance, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan have assumed low scores in the governance 
indicators classification whereas Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have achieved higher 
scores (Melville and Mironyuk, 2016). Economic performance has also shown 
pronounced variability, with the Baltic States performing better while Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan being the worst performers. 
The existing literature on institutional quality and  economic growth in post-socialist 
countries is restricted mostly to descriptive analysis of the development of institutions 
and economies (Melville and Mironyuk, 2016), conducted more than a decade ago 
(Matkowski, 2004) and limited to only one particular region (Ahmadov et al., 2013; 
Aixal and Fabro, 2008; Auzan, 2017; Ghedrovici and Ostapenko, 2013; Gurvich, 2016; 
Lühiste, 2006). 
In view of the scant empirical evidence on the impact of institutions on economic 
growth, this study purports to revisit and effectively apply the existing theoretical 
knowledge on the fundamental relationship to a dataset containing practically all post-
socialist economies. This research effort supported by recently developed panel 
cointegration methodologies provides robust and insightful evidence on the 
institutions-growth nexus in the context of the post-socialist literature.




The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical 
underpinnings in the extant literature as well as reviews the empirical studies on the 
link between economic growth and institutions. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
economic and institutional development in the post-socialist countries while section 4 
touches on the methodological framework employed. Section 5 elaborates on the 
generated evidence whilst section 6 provides the concluding remarks. 
2. Institutions and economic growth:  theoretical considerations and empirical 
evidence
Central to understanding how institutions influence economic growth is the transaction 
costs’ theory. According to North (1992), good institutions facilitate low transaction 
costs which in turn galvanize economic growth. In the context of formal institutions, 
property rights hold a principal position among all economic institutions which is in 
line with extensive research on its impact on economic growth (see for instance, 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Asoni, 2008; Besley and Ghatak, 2009; Kerekes and 
Williamson, 2008). The rule of law’s impact on economic growth can be summarised 
in three areas as described by Haggard et al. (2008). If individuals are not confident in 
the equal treatment by the judicial system a) they return to costly private enforcement 
of contracts; b) rent-seeking behaviour is incentivised by government officials and other 
economic agents and, therefore, the level of corruption rises; c) rent-seeking and 
corruption raise barriers to long-term growth such as protectionism and monopolies. 
For instance, Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) have shown that the rule of law has a causal 
impact on the level of income. 
Regarding the impact of informal institutions on economic growth, Ashraf and Galor 
(2007) provide evidence suggesting that cultural diffusion and assimilation 




significantly affects economic development whereas, Tabellini (2008) argues that 
individual values of members in a society influence the well-functioning of government 
institutions and economic development.
On the empirical front, North and Thomas (1973) were possibly the first to point out 
that factor accumulation and innovation described by the neoclassical growth model are 
only rough sources of economic growth and that institutions are the fundamental factors 
which lead to the differences in their level of development across different countries1.
Acemoglu et al. (2002) establish a positive relationship between GDP per capita and a 
proxy of property rights instrumented as an average protection against the risk of 
expropriation. However, it was not possible to establish causation at that point. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) developed a theory according to which initial factor 
endowments such as climate, soil and density of native population influenced the path 
of institutional development for colonies in South and North America. More 
specifically, the initial factor endowments influence the level of inequality at the 
beginning, which, in turn, led to the creation of economic institutions that persist over 
time. In a later study, Easterly (2007) confirmed that factor endowments predict 
inequality, which, in turn, predicts long-term economic growth through institutions and 
schooling. 
Several empirical studies showed that variables of good governance such as control of 
corruption, stability of property rights or democracy are closely correlated with 
variables such as GDP growth rate per capita, investment or human capital development 
1 It should be noted that within the realm of economic development, the importance of technology as a 
driving force for economic and human development has been emphasized by many scholars (see for 
instance  Ejemeyovwi and Osabuohien 2018). 




(see Knack and Keefer, 1995; Barro, 1996).  In a later study, Rodrik et al. (2004) tested 
three competing hypotheses on the determinants of long-term economic growth: 
geography, international trade and economic integration and institutions. Using panel 
regressions, Rodrik et al. (2004) find that institutional quality is the only factor which 
is consistently significant and robust to different model specifications. 
In an earlier contribution Rodrik, (1998) provides supporting evidence of the hypothesis 
that certain institutions such as an independent and competent judiciary, non-corrupt 
bureaucracy, and social insurance affect positively economic growth in the event of 
external shocks. In a study that focuses on medium and short-term growth, Hausmann 
et al. (2004) introduce the concept of growth accelerations and show that changes in 
political regimes are significant predictors of the accelerations in general. Notably, 
Hausmann et al. (2004) found that a transition to an autocratic regime has a more 
favourable effect on growth accelerations than a transition to a democratic regime. In 
line with several studies, Dollar and Kraay (2003), and Rodrik et al. (2002) assert that 
political institutions of limited government cause economic growth. Furthermore, 
Dollar and Kraay (2003) find that cross-country variation in trade, institutions, and their 
historical and geographical determinants are not very informative of their relative 
importance for growth in the long run.
On a more critical note, Hausmann et al. (2004) made a distinction between growth 
accelerations which eventually stop and the ones with a long-lasting effect. While 
financial liberalisation and external positive trade shocks have a stronger influence on 
growth accelerations, it is the economic reform and political regime change that 
increase the likelihood of sustained accelerations. Glaeser et al. (2004) revisit the debate 
over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, 
growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. The authors 




maintain that exploring the causal link between institutions and economic growth has 
proved extremely difficult due to both conceptual problems with the measurement of 
institutions2 and limitations of econometric techniques. However, the reverse direction, 
namely that growth in income and human capital causes institutional improvement, is 
most closely associated with the work of Lipset (1960), who in turn gives credit to 
Aristotle.  Empirically,  Lipset’s  hypothesis  that  growth  leads  to  better  political 
institutions  has  received  support  in  the  work  of  Przeworski  (1991,  2000)  and  his 
associates Alvarez et al. (2000) and Barro (1999). Furthermore, on the significance of 
political  governance  Asongu  et  al.  (2019)  suggest  that  political  instability  can  be 
detrimental to economic growth as investors transfer their capital to economies with 
more stable political governance. In other words, economies with mediocre political 
institutions  are  likely  to  experience  outflow  of  capital  and  dwindling  investment 
activity (see Ndikumana et al., 2015; Davies, 2008; Collier et al., 2004). 
In addition to the growth accelarations, Hausman et al. (2008) introduced the growth 
diagnostics tool to quantify how institutions influence short-term economic growth. 
They show that in each country there are specific distortions, which could not only 
constrain economic growth but reverse the effects of certain policies due to second-
order effects. A country therefore with a lot of idiosyngratic distortions that hamper 
economic welfare could divert their efforts in eliminating them to rekindle economic 
growth. 
2 For instance, Glaeser et al. (2004) maintain that the “government effectiveness” variable is a 
clear outcome measure which is highly correlated with the level of economic development, 
rather than political constraints per se. 




Undoubtedly, every country has its unique set of conditions which determine to a large 
extent the impact of policies and institutions on the economic welfare. In the context of 
initial dependence, North et al. (2009) by classifying political and institutional regimes 
in countries as limited access and open access3 orders, emphasised the importance of 
access to economic and political power. In the limited access orders the economic 
returns and political power distribution is highly skewed towards the elites. The 
economic supe iority of open access regimes is mainly due to being more “flexible and 
adaptive”. However, there is no natural way of development from limited access order 
to open access order. At the same time, open access orders’ institutions and policies 
would not work in limited access societies due to the different nature of such states. 
Commander and Nikoloski (2010), explore whether commonly used measures of 
institutions such as the political system, the business environment and the perceived 
business constraints have any significant impact on the performance of countries or 
firms. In all instances, Commander and Nik loski (2010) find little evidence of a robust 
link between measures of institutions and indicators of performance. In line with 
Glaeser et al. (2004), Commander and Nikoloski (2010) argued that mis-measurement, 
mis-specification, complexity and non-linearity are all relevant factors for the 
ambiguity of their results, to the default proposition of institutions affecting 
performance. 
Khan (2010) provides an intriguing perspective on the matter by focusing on the 
distribution of power in the societies. From his perspective, in developed societies, 
3 North et al. (2009) describe open access orders as highly developed societies with the strong 
rule of law and property rights, impersonal relationships and decentralised governments, while 
limited access orders lag behind in all these criteria




power is distributed towards formal institutions, while in developing ones most of the 
power is held within informal institutions. Therefore, it is not possible to merely 
transplant institutions from the developed societies, because the informal powers, if 
they are strong enough, could disregard formal rules and influence any process. 
Following that argument, Khan (2010) introduces the growth-stability and trade-off 
framework, where he shows that if the proposed institutional changes differ from the 
desired ones by the elites; they will oppose them and cause instability in the society. 
Therefore, in the short to medium run, all reforms must balance between growth and 
stability.
Overall, there seems to be broad consensus concerning the importance of institutions 
for economic performance. However, several studies question the robustness of the 
growth – institutions nexus pointing to mis-measurement or mis-specification issues 
while there is some preliminary evidence that the relationship may not be stable over 
time.
3. Economic and institutional development in the post-socialist countries 
Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, growth was stagnant in practically all the union 
states (Sherman, 1994). Imbalances had reached critical levels and oil prices had started 
dwindling alarmingly. Almost 30 years ago, the Soviet Union was formally split into 
fifteen independent states with each one of them following their own divergent paths in 
reforming their institutions. Existing opposing views and country-specific constraints 
might to some extent help explain the institutional divergence and the progress made 
so far. 




The transition process of the emerging post socialist economies to a capitalist system 
of prodcution constitutes an interesting and stimulating research topic to explore. To 
gain an understanding of the pattern of economic growth and the development of 
institutional factors over time we have grouped the post-socialist countries into five 
groups (see Table 1), based on geographical proximity, size of the economies, 
development of economic ties4 and similarities in culture. Broadly, we have applied a 
similar classification to the one used by IMF. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Figure 1 depicts the economic growth trajectories of the groups of post-socialist 
countries. The observed magnitude and fluctuation of the growth rates of GDP over the 
period 1996–2000 reflect the great divergence in political and economic conditions in 
these country-groups. In contrast to the turbulence of the first decade of transition, the 
early and mid-2000s saw uniformly strong growth with the Eastern Europe and the 
Caucasus group outpacing the other groups during 2000-2007, while the Baltic States 
suffered the most from the Global Financial Crisis in 2009-10. With favorable global 
conditions and increasing confidence in convergence with Western Europe, the average 
4 There is a high level of interdependency in GDP growth for all the countries whose economies 
remain interconnected presenting high correlations in GDP growth ranging from 0.88 to 0.99 
(Benešová and Smutka, 2016). 




growth for the entire sample in the early to mid-2000s was around 6 percent, with no 
country growing at less than 3 percent annually, a faster rate than most countries have 
consistently managed before. However, growth in this period was imbalanced, driven 
by large-scale borrowing for consumption and construction. The inherent 
vulnerabilities combined with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis had a 
devastating effect. Output declined by 6 percent on average and ranged up to 18 percent, 
a more severe impact than in any other region of the world. According to IMF (2014), 
those countries that took bolder and more front-loaded reforms, Central Europe and 
then Baltics were rewarded with a faster return to growth.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Over the past ten years, average rents from natural resources for the so-called resource-
rich countries have ranged from 25 to 50 percent of their GDP. According to Harford 
and Klein (2005) the countries that have been endowed with a wealth of natural 
resources are likely less willing to put in place reforms, as these reforms will potentially 
limit their elites’ ability to appropriate those rents. It should also be noted that in 
countries with higher average oil rents and total natural resources as a percent of GDP 
government effectiveness is significantly low (Ahmadov et al., 2013).
In resource-poor countries the political challenges that they have faced over the last 
twenty-five years were more pronounced. Georgia for instance, experienced the Rose 
Revolution in 2003 while Kyrgyzstan had the Tulip Revolution in 2005 and the Second 
Kyrgyz Revolution in 2010. . In a nutshell, all these events constitute critical junctures 
that could lead to the development of new institutions, that potentially impact positively 
economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005).
In terms of institution building, the results of the first years of transition were uneven. 
Almost all countries suffered from recessions and were vulnerable to crises that swept 




the region in the wake of the Asian crisis in 1997. It can be inferred from Figure 2, the 
starting point of institutional quality was not the same for all the country groups; it 
presented a great deal of variation with the Baltic States and Central Europe preserving 
the highest scores overall. 
In Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the most robust economic performance is 
exhibited by countries, which grew the most in quality of institutions, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, the extreme case of institutions improvement in 
Georgia’s is not accompanied by the same level of economic growth. South-Eastern 
Europe is the only region, where all countries performed reasonably well in terms of 
the quality of institutions. Central Europe is perhaps the most contradicting case. The 
countries with the highest growth such as Poland and the Slovak Republic exhibit 
similar economic growth, but their institutional quality presents diverging paths. The 
Baltic States is the most convergent group regarding economic growth; however, slight 
differences in growth seem to be inversely related with the change in institutional 
quality over time. Summing up, our preliminary analysis of the links between economic 
growth and institutions in the post-socialist countries provides no clear cut results. 
Despite a common heritage, post-socialist countries present stark differences on the 
initial level in institutional quality. The only region which provides some indication of 
a positive relationship between economic growth and institutional quality is Eastern 
Europe and the Caucasus. This could be connected to the low base effect while the 
effect of the soaring oil prices in the period 2000-7 could not be neglected, especially 
for the resource-rich countries.




The ensuing economic reforms that were undertaken following the demise of Soviet 
Union can also be proxied by the Transition Indicators (TI) published by EBRD5. In 
constructing the TI, assessments are made in six key areas: large-scale privatisation, 
small-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, 
trade and foreign exchange system, and competition policy. Immediately after their 
independence, almost all countries started with low TI scores. However, by 1993 the 
Baltic States swiftly toped the rankings whilst other countries, for instance 
Turkmenistan, Belarus and Uzbekistan have scored rather poorly. The following plot 
presents the transition indicators of EBRD by type of reform and by region. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
As Figure 1 shows, despite the ups and downs, overall the transition period has been 
one of strong convergence with Western Europe (IMF, 2014), albeit with significant 
divergence across the country groups. 
The Central European countries were more advanced in terms of privatization 
processes, which led to the private sector representing about 80% of GDP.  Overall, 
these countries not only exhibited considerable growth in GDP per capita income 
despite the hardships at the beginning of the transformation (Matkowski, 2004), but 
they also managed to sustain growth over time. On the contrary, the Balkan countries 
5 The EBRD assessed progress in transition through a set of transition indicators. These were 
used to track reform developments in the countries of operations that primarily included the 
post-socialist ones in the period 1989-2014. Progress was measured against the standards of 
industrialised market economies, while EBRD recognises that there is neither a “pure” market 
economy nor a unique end-point for transition. 




have not witnessed a significant change in income levels ranking considerably lower 
than Central Europe counterparts in terms of their position of Transition Process Index 
and Human Development Index developed by the EBRD and the United Nations 
respectively.
4. Data and methodology
Our dataset spans the period 1996 to 2016 while certain countries (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) were omitted from the sample 
due to insufficient observations. The key independent variables used in this study are 
the World Governance Indicators (WGI) as developed by Kaufmann et al. (2011) which 
practically include six indices, namely regulatory quality, rule of law, political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, control of corruption and voice and 
accountability. Table A1 in the appendix presents the variables used along with the data 
sources.
Our methodological framework is grounded on co ntegration analysis. Traditionally, 
the presence of unit roots in univariate time series is explored through DF (Dickey-
Fuller) or ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) tests. Recently, more powerful unit root 
tests have been proposed - such as those by Levin, Lin and Chu, (2002), Im, Pesaran 
and Shin, (2003) and Hadri, (2000) - which are shown to perform more efficiently than 
the unit root tests applied to individual series. According to Alexiou, et al., (2016) while 
these tests are commonly termed ‘panel unit root’ tests, theoretically speaking, they are 
simply multiple-series unit root tests that have been applied to panel data structures 
(where the presence of cross-sections generates “multiple series” out of a single series) 




(p.47). In this paper, both common and individual unit root tests have been utilized i.e. 
Levin, Lin, Chu (LLC), Im, Pesaran, Shin (IPS), Fisher – ADF and Fisher - PP. 
Cointegration methodology purports to investigate the presence of spurious 
relationships in the event of non-stationary time series. If such a stationary linear 
relationship is evident then the non-stationary time series are cointegrated which may 
be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relationship amongst the variables of interest. 
In determining whether such a long run relationship exists, we adopt a panel 
cointegration test proposed by Pedroni (1999) which is based on the two-step residual-
based strategy of Engle and Granger (1987).
In this context, seven different statistics that test for panel cointegration are estimated, 
out of which four - Panel-v, panel-rho, panel non-parametric-t and panel parametric-t - 
are based on a within-dimension and three - group-rho, group non-parametric-t and 
group parametric-t - on the between-dimension.  It should be noted that these tests are 
applicable to heterogeneous panels and the null hypothesis is that of no cointegration. 
The formulation for all cointegration tests is couched in the following terms:
yit = i + 1 X1,i,t + 2 X2,i,t +…….+ n Xn,i,t  + vit     (1)
where Xi,t are the regressors and n the cross-sections. Based on equation (1) a regression 
on the residuals is then performed:
vi,t = ζivi,t-1 + zi,t.                  (2)
The respective estimation process produces the seven different statistics - Panel-v, 
panel-rho, panel non-parametric-t and panel parametric-t, group-rho, group non-
parametric-t and group parametric-t (for a more detailed account of the entire process 
see Pedroni, 1999). 




We proceed by using the autoregressive distributed lag  model (ARDL, p,q) as the 
emphasis is placed on the need to have consistent and efficient estimates of the 
parameters in a long-run relationship. According to Pesaran et al. (1999), a dynamic 
heterogeneous regression can be incorporated into the error correction model using the 
ARDL approach to cointegration.  The general empirical specification of the ARDL 
model can be expressed in the following form: 
  (3)𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  ∑𝑝𝑗 = 1𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ― 𝑗 + ∑𝑞𝑗 = 0𝜁𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ― 𝑗 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
where Xit is a vector of explanatory variables and vt captures the group-specific effect; 
i denotes cross-sections and t denotes time. Cointegrating series implies that the error 
term is an I(0) process. By re-parametrizing (3) we can arrive at the error correction 
specification which assumes the following form:
  (4) 𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ― 𝑗― 𝜇𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ― 𝑗∑𝑝 ― 1𝑗 = 1𝜉𝑖𝑗𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ― 𝑗 + ∑𝑞 ― 1𝑗 = 0𝜁𝑖𝑗𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ― 𝑗 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
The error correction coefficient λi captures the speed of adjustment which is assumed 
to be negative and statistically significant when, in the presence of a shock, there is 
convergence to long run equilibrium. Equation 4 can be estimated by three different 
estimators, the mean group (MG) model of Pesaran and Smith (1995), the Pooled Mean 
Group (PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999), and the dynamic fixed 
effects estimator (DFE). All three estimators consider the long-run equilibrium and the 
heterogeneity of the dynamic adjustment process (Demetriades and Law, 2006) and are 
computed by maximum likelihood. In this study we consider the advanced version of 
the Mean Group (MG) estimator, the PMG estimation procedure that is applicable to 
nonstationary panels. In this context, short-run parameters, intercepts terms, speed of 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium values and error variances are permitted to vary 
across groups (as in MG estimator) whilst for long-run coefficients a restriction of 




equivalence is imposed. This is particularly useful when there are reasons to expect that 
the long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables is similar across countries 
or, at least, a sub-set of them. Also important is that the shortrun adjustment can be 
country-specific, due to the widely different impact of the vulnerability to financial 
crises, external shocks, and stabilization or reform policies and so on. 
All  in  all,  the  ARDL  model,  especially  the  PMG  estimator  provides  consistent 
coefficients despite the possible presence of endogeneity because it includes lags of 
dependent and independent variables (Pesaran et al., 1999). An important assumption 
for  the  consistency  of  the  ARDL  model  is  that  the  resulting  residual  of  the  error-
correction model will be serially uncorrelated, and the explanatory variables can be 
treated as exogenous. Such conditions can be fulfilled by including the ARDL (p,q) 
lags for the dependent (p) and independent variables (q) in the error correction form. 
Third, the relative size of T and N is crucial, since when both are large it allows us to 
use the dynamic panel technique, which helps to avoid the bias in the average estimators 
and  resolves  the  issue  of  heterogeneity.  Eberhardt  and  Teal  (2011)  argue  that  the 
treatment of heterogeneity is central to understanding the growth process. Pesaran and 
Shin (1999) show that the traditional ARDL approach can be used for long-run analysis. 
Specifically,  the  ARDL  approach  can  deal  effectively  with  potential  endogeneity 
issues, remains valid regardless of whether the regressors are exogenous or endogenous 
and irrespective of whether the variables are I(0) or I(1). However, the presence of I(2) 
variables renders the methodology inappropriate (Pesaran et al., 2001). In this study, 
the issue of stationarity has been taken into consideration and a series of unit root tests 
have been applied, namely, the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC), and the Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (IPS) unit root tests. 




The baseline regression model was formulated along the lines suggested by Barro 
(1996); Góes (2016); Osman et al. (2011) and Alexiou et al. (2018), where the 
dependent variable is the growth in real GDP (GROWTH) and the explanatory 
variables consists of INST, a vector including all world governance indicators (WGI), 
GOV which denotes government expenditure, INV for investment, INF for inflation 
rate, TRADE as a measure of openness, NAT which denotes natural resources, 
WORLD that is a measure of world growth, and EDU that measures the level of 
education. Table A2 in the appendix presents the respective descriptive statistics.
5. Empirical Results and Discussion
The analysis gets under way with an assessment of the order of integration of the 
variables included in the model. Table A3 in the appendix reports the panel unit roots 
test estimates. An inspection of Table A3 suggests in the variables possess properties 
of mixed order of integration i.e. I(0) and I(1) but not I(2). It should be stressed that 
even when individual effects and individual linear trends were considered, no 
significant differences were observed.   
Having established the order of integration we then test for cointegration. All the 
reported statistics shown in Table A4 in the Appendix, suggest that there is evidence of 
cointegrating relationships among the variables used. Our evidence was further 
reinforced by a complementary test - Kao’s Residual Cointegration test – which 
rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% level of significance.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
In the long run, according to the PMG estimates reported in Table 2 apart from the 
variable INST that measures the average WGI impact of all institutions, the rule of law 




(ROL) and voice and accountability (VAC) are also significant. In line with a 
substantial body of research (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2006; Haggard et al., 2008; 
Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005; Rodrik et al., 2004), our results indicate that the rule of law 
benefits economic growth in the post-socialist States. As one could expect, the rule of 
law which enables the protection of property rights and supports the business activity 
by stimulating investment. Furthermore, voice and accountability which captures the 
social dimensions such as freedom of speech, media and level of political participation 
is also found to affect positively the economic growth. According to Doucouliagos and 
Ulubaşoǧlu, (2008); Rigobon and Rodrik, (2005); Tavares and Wacziarg, (2001) voice 
and accountability mainly influence economic growth through investment, human 
capital, lower inflation and higher level of economic freedom.
As far as the control variables are concerned, government expenditure is insignificant 
and negatively associated with the economic growth in all models. The negative sign 
might to some extent suggest that policy variables become “irrelevant” in the presence 
of institutional variables (Acemoglu et al., 2002). Investment is significant bearing a 
positive sign in models 1, 3, 6 and 7, which lends support to the neoclassical growth 
model (Solow, 1956). At the same time, inflation exerts a negative impact on growth 
across all estimated models which is in line with our expectations. In line with Barro 
(1996), the trade openness was found to be positively associated with the economic 
growth across all estimated models. Natural resources are found to be insignificant 
across all models, suggesting that most of the gains in the GDP growth for resource-
rich countries practically reflect higher oil and gas prices. The negative effect of 
education on economic growth may reflect either mis-specification issues or potential 
interaction with the institutional variables as has been suggested by Acemoglu et al. 
(2014). Last, the world growth is found to be positively associated with economic 




growth in all models which is in line with our expectations as the sampled economies 
are reintegrated into the global economy. 
As we move along to the short run estimates shown in Table 3, it appears that other 
institutional factors become more relevant. More specifically, the regulatory quality 
(REG) is now significant whilst the rule of law (ROL) turned out to be insignificant. 
The sign of VAC however has turned negative which appears to be a paradoxical 
finding, albeit in line with those who have argued that a gradual improvement in 
institutional quality allows the economy to adjust in a smoother manner to prevent a 
shock to a system, hence driving instability in the country. Evidently, in the short-run 
none of the control variables maintains a statistically significant effect apart from the 
investment and the world growth. It is worth noting that the error correction term in all 
estimated models is shown to be statistically significant and negative indicating the 
speed of adjustment to its long-run equilibrium levels. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
In our effort to explore the causal dimension of our key variables we have performed 
panel causality tests using the WGI variables. Our results indicate a unidirectional 
causality that runs from ROL, VAC and COC to economic growth (see Table A5 in 
appendix). In addition, as a robustness check, we have utilised the Transition Progress 
Index (TI) published by EBRD. In line with the causality tests on WGI, we establish 
unidirectional causality (see Table A6) between all six components and economic 
growth, thus, confirming the importance of institutional quality in fostering economic 
growth. In the case of TI, there is also evidence of the established bi-directional 
causality, especially in the case GER, TFC and COMPOL which imply a feedback 
mechanism suggesting that growth goes hand in hand with critical inputs such as 




governance,  trade  linkages  and  a  functioning  foreign  exchange  system  as  well  as 
competition policy. 
Overall, there is no shadow of a doubt that institutional quality as reflected on the rule 
of  law,  the  level  of  corruption,  and  democratic  accountability  are  instrumental  in 
determining the speed at which developing economies can grow. Equally important 
however are cultural aspects such as beliefs in the importance of individual effort and 
morality, that to a certain extent determine the level of trust and respect for each other 
hence, encouraging welfare-enhancing social interactions (Tabellini, 2010). According 
to Guiso, et al. (2006), cultural norms may take a long time to evolve. As such, informal 
institutions  could  persist  for  centuries,  and  even  if  governments  undertake  some 
targeted interventions it could take up to 40 years until some tangible results are realized 
(Auzan, 2017). It is therefore imperative that policy makers are aware of the inherent 
interactions between informal social practices and formal institutions so as to set the 
right  policies  that  can  potentially  support  economic  development  (for  more  on  the 
interaction between informal social practices and formal institutions see Freidenberg 
and Levitsky, 2006; Ellickson, 2007; Grzymala-Busse, 2010). 
6. Concluding remarks  
Nearly a generation has passed since the ex-Soviet economies embarked on a historic 
transition from central planning to market-based policies. Inevitably, this process 
proved harder than many envisaged almost 30 years ago. Institutional factors have been 
difficult to advance in the face of opposition from the insiders with vested interests 
benefiting from the status quo. 
Using a combination of cointegration tests and the ARDL methodology we provide 
evidence on the short as well as long-run relationships between institutional variables 




and economic growth. Our research adds to the existing evidence on the impact of 
institutional quality and economic growth. Overall, improvements in regulatory quality 
could positively contribute to GDP growth. Equally, advancements in the rule of law 
and voice and accountability are positively associated with economic growth in the 
long-run.  In  this  context,  policymakers  would  have  to  implement  policies  that 
strengthen  and  insulate  those  institutions  to  reap  the  long-term  benefits  for  their 
countries. In the short run however, changes in voice and accountability are associated 
with declining economic growth which might reflect the fact that gradual improvement 
in  institutional  quality  provides  a  breathing  space  for  the  economy  to  adjust  in  a 
smoother manner while at the same time it insulates from a shock to the system with 
adverse consequences. Certainly, building effective institutions should be interpreted 
as a dynamic process that requires fine-tuning and adjustment of institutions to ever-
changing technological, social, economic, and political conditions. 
Finally, we hold the view that institutional quality has a long-lasting positive effect on 
economic growth and prosperity. In this respect, Aristotle remains well-timed, as a free 
citizen will always seek eudaemonia within institutions. The analysis undertaken in this 
study  poses  challenging  questions  for  those  who  envision  a  viable  solution  to 
sustainable economic growth and development. Currently, we do not seem to possess a 
deep understanding of the forces that may lead to good or bad political equilibria. 
Effective  developmental  policies  can  be  introduced  once  we  have  recognized  and 
comprehended how these forces interact in different economic and political regimes.  
Future research could benefit from the use of alternative measures of growth that focus 
on quality, efficiency and sustainability.  
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Figure 3: Transition indicators of EBRD by reform type and by region in 1989-2013.
Source: IMF (2014)
TABLES
Table 1:  Groups of post-socialist countries
Group List of countries
Central Asia Kazakhstan; Kyrgyz Republic; Tajikistan; 
Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan.
Eastern Europe and 
Caucasus
Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Georgia; Moldova; 
Russian Federation; Ukraine.
South-Eastern Europe Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; 
Croatia; FYROM; Montenegro; Romania
Central Europe Czech Republic; Hungary; Poland; Slovak Republic; 
Slovenia
Baltic States Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania




Table 2: Long run estimates (PMG)
















GOV -0.066 0.029 -0.075 0.0029 -0.0424 0.0121 0.0227
(0.087) (0.068) (0.087) (0.082) (0.0653) (0.0772) (0.0871)
INV 0.064** 0.0429 0.0598** 0.0392 0.0292 0.0509* 0.0578**
(0.027) (0.0282) (0.0264) (0.0277) (0.0278) (0.0272) (0.026)
INF -0.036*** -0.016*** -0.036*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.030***
(0.009) (0.0045) (0.0092) (0.0074) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0078)
TRADE 0.063*** 0.045*** 0.0607*** 0.0572*** 0.0422*** 0.0497*** 0.052***
(0.0091) (0.009) (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0097) (0.0101) (0.00977)
NAT -0.0119 -0.0737 -0.117 -0.0632 -0.0058 -0.091 -0.045
(0.0787) (0.094) (0.0839) (0.0907) (0.0869) (0.0857) (0.0952)
EDU -0.076*** -0.054*** -0.085*** -0.066*** -0.057*** -0.063*** -0.067***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.011) (0.0109) (0.0112)
WORLD 1.106*** 0.802*** 1.060*** 0.939*** 0.828*** 0.919*** 1.005***
(0.113) (0.126) (0.117) (0.125) (0.122) (0.121) (0.114)
  Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




  Table 3: Short run estimates (PMG)
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Short-Run estimates
-0.81*** -0.76*** -0.78*** -0.75*** -0.76*** -0.76*** -0.77***Error 
Correction















D.GOV -0.156 -0.263 -0.164 -0.132 -0.337 -0.336 -0.144
(0.266) (0.27) (0.275) (0.248) (0.254) (0.244) (0.265)
D.INV 0.381*** 0.401*** 0.381*** 0.428*** 0.434*** 0.432*** 0.425***
(0.0776) (0.079) (0.0721) (0.0798) (0.0792) (0.0771) (0.0815)
D.INF -0.0283 -0.029 -0.0334 -0.0262 -0.0447 -0.0397 -0.00996
(0.0484) (0.0534) (0.0513) (0.0481) (0.0488) (0.0504) (0.0497)
D.TRADE -0.00781 0.0153 -0.022 -0.00162 -0.0128 0.00483 5.12E-05
(0.0392) (0.0412) (0.04) (0.0357) (0.0347) (0.0398) (0.038)
D.NAT 1.071 1.067 1.265 1.52 1.166 1.995 0.833
(2.534) (2.49) (2.586) (2.586) (2.259) (2.637) (2.462)
D.EDU -0.0351 0.0437 0.0277 0.00284 -0.0617 -0.0425 -0.00343
(0.0821) (0.0694) (0.0671) (0.0669) (0.0759) (0.0946) (0.0591)
D.WORLD 0.275* 0.342*** 0.263* 0.404*** 0.473*** 0.374** 0.287**
(0.152) (0.129) (0.151) (0.132) (0.134) (0.146) (0.14)
Constant 6.016*** 11.15*** 7.121*** 7.748*** 12.20*** 9.638*** 3.782***
(0.612) (0.943) (0.671) (0.656) (1.033) (0.857) (0.6)
Obs 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Log LL -782.6 -784 -779.5 -770.4 -775.6 -770.3 -780.7
     Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lag level of 1.





























Governance and enterprise restructuring
Price liberalisation
Trade and foreign exchange system
Competition policy
Control variables
 GOV Government expenditure (% of GDP)
 INV Gross capital formation (% of GDP)
INF Consumer prices index annual %
TRADE Sum of exports and imports as % of GDP
NAT Natural resources as % of GDP 
EDU School enrolment, tertiary gross (%) lagged 5 
years
WORLD Aggregate real GDP annual world growth 
Real GDP Natural logarithm of GDP, constant 2010 US$
Sources: World Bank, EBRD & IMF; the transition indicators of EBRD refer to the period 
1996-2014; The year 2014 was the last year of these indicators as EBRD developed a new 
approach to track transition and discontinued publishing the transition indicators.




  Table A2: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean St Dev Min Max Kurtosis Skewness
GROWTH 4.45 6.24 -16.7 88.96 61.4 4.46
GOV 17.17 1 4.13 7.32 29.94 -0.42 -0.4
INV 24.82 6.67 5.39 57.99 2.57 1
INF 11.61 51.08 -8.53 1058.37 356.8 17.8
TRADE 99.99 31.57 36.55 199.68 -0.31 0.46
NAT 5.93 11.28 0 82.53 10.99 3.06
VAC -0.17 1.01 -2.26 1.28 -1.05 -0.39
POLST -0.04 0.77 -2.11 1.31 -0.75 -0.33
GOVEF -0.17 0.75 -1.64 1.19 -1.16 0.12
REG -0.05 0.96 -2.34 1.7 -0.6 -0.48
COC -0.33 0.8 -1.74 1.3 -1.14 0.28
ROL -0.33 0.74 -1.67 1.37 -0.97 0.29
EDU5 38.56 19.18 8.8 89.11 -0.6 0.59
WORLD 4.01 1.37 0.1 6.46 1.28 -0.53




Table A3: Unit root tests
Levin, Lin Chu
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin








GROWTH -8.98 0.00 -8.86 0.00 189.89 0.00 491.21 0.00
D(VAC) -12.1 0.00 -12.07 0.00 216.61 0.00 223.08 0.00
POLST -4.1 0.00 -4.11 0.00 104.18 0.00 67.87 0.09
D(GOV
EF)
-10.9 0.00 -12.61 0.00 233.86 0.00 329.99 0.00
D(REG) -10.12 0.00 -11.98 0.00 225.87 0.00 273.32 0.00
D(COC) -17.8 0.00 N/A N/A 362.07 0.00 385.57 0.00
D(ROL) -9.5 0.00 -9.25 0.00 174.69 0.00 202.53 0.00
D(INST) -8.58 0.00 -10.63 0.00 200.11 0.00 241.97 0.00
D(EDU) -12.35 0.00 -7.84 0.00 140.4 0.00 121.01 0.00
WORLD -13.62 0.00 -8.41 0.00 161.21 0.00 161.76 0.00
GOV -4.22 0.00 -4.19 0.00 99.46 0.00 106.14 0.00
INV -3.17 0.00 -2.93 0.00 86.12 0.00 66.38 0.12
INF -12.05 0.00 -9.92 0.00 207.9 0.00 261.84 0.00
TRADE -4.82 0.00 -5.12 0.00 118.15 0.00 76.67 0.02
NAT -2.61 0.00 -1.73 0.04 85.72 0.00 89.05 0.00





















V -3.97 -4.07 -4.27 -3.91 -3.71 -3.76 -3.8
 rho 0.21 0.13 0.4 0.44 0.6 0.34 0.09
 PP -6.06*** -6.12*** -5.08*** -5.06 -5.77*** -6.06*** -6.64***
Pedroni ADF -7.63*** -8.15*** -6.86*** -6.43*** -6.93*** -7.72*** -6.51***
rho 1.24 1.23 1.46 1.75 1.49 1.09 1.03
PP -9.66*** -9.66*** -9.25*** -9.49*** -10.49*** -10.60*** -12.57***
ADF -7.88*** -7.88*** -8.24*** -7.68*** -8.25*** -8.45*** -10.35***
Kao  -5.91*** -5.91*** -5.97*** -5.91*** -5.97*** -5.88*** -5.99***
Note: Lag selection chosen according to Swartz Information Criterion; individual intercepts 
and trends assumed; *** p-value <0.01.
Table A5: Pairwise Causality Tests (Lags: 2) – entire sample
 Null Hypothesis: W-Stat. Prob. 
 ROL does not Granger cause GROWTH  3.53741 0.0241
 GROWTH does not Granger cause ROL  1.94596 0.4642
 VAC does not Granger GROWTH  4.26522 0.0003
 GROWTH does not Granger cause VAC  1.80716 0.3210
 COC does not Granger cause GROWTH  3.68614 0.0112
 GROWTH does not Granger cause COC  1.91139 0.4256
 GOVEF does not Granger cause GROWTH  2.87658 0.3100
 GROWTH does not Granger cause GOVEFF  1.52163 0.1264
 REG does not Granger cause GROWTH  3.13053 0.1357
 GROWTH does not Granger cause REG  1.86163 0.3733
 POLST does not Granger cause GROWTH  3.01800 0.2003
 GROWTH does not Granger cause POLSTB  1.58841 0.1606




Note: We reject the null that ROL, VAC and COC do not homogeneously cause GROWTH, 
but we cannot reject the null in the opposite direction. In the case of GOVEFF, REG and 
POLSTB we cannot reject the null in both directions.
Table A6: Pairwise Causality Tests (Lags: 2) – entire sample
 Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob. 
 LSPRIV does not Granger Cause GROWTH  10.8277 3.E-05
 GROWTH does not Granger Cause LSPRIV  5.26557 0.0055
 SSPRIV does not Granger Cause GROWTH  5.31021 0.0053
 GROWTH does not Granger Cause SSPRIV  1.94200 0.1446
 GER does not Granger Cause GROWTH  9.88390 6.E-05
 GROWTH does not Granger Cause GER  1.60662 0.2017
 PRLIB does not Granger Cause GROWTH  5.71381 0.0035
 GROWTH does not Granger Cause PRLIB  13.2848 2.E-06
 TFX does not Granger Cause GROWTH  8.16302 0.0003
 GROWTH does not Granger Cause TFX  0.56172 0.5706
 COMPOL does not Granger Cause GROWTH  10.1136 5.E-05
 GROWTH does not Granger Cause COMPOL  0.86020 0.4238
Note: We reject the null that LSPRIV, SSPRIV, GER, PRLIB, TFX and COMPOL does not Granger 
cause GROWTH. Also, we reject the null that GROWTH does not Granger cause LSPRIV and PRLIB 
(bidirectional relationship). However, we cannot reject the nul that GROWTH does not Granger cause 
GER, TFC and COMPOL. 
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